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Predicting Groundwater Trading in the Upper Republican Natural Resource District
Market Report

Yr
Ago

4 Wks
Ago

4/19/13

Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,
51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$123.46 $124.93 $126.11
180.44

165.52

162.72

*

131.54

136.66

185.12

193.57

190.51

80.63

72.30

78.11

77.34

77.98

83.26

*

90.00

115.00

366.57

293.42

288.29

5.46

7.11

6.99

6.10

7.46

6.66

14.13

14.56

14.33

10.23

12.52

11.21

3.51

4.26

4.25

Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
*No Market

225.00

*

245.00

145.00

227.50

227.50

97.50

217.50

222.50

236.50

265.00

239.50

78.00

100.50

91.50

While surface water trading has occurred regularly
throughout the Western United States and the rest of the
world for decades, the use of any type of groundwater
trading has been very limited. However, groundwater is
increasingly under stress from overuse and many areas are
starting to regulate groundwater use. While the public
benefits from efficient use of groundwater include
adequate stream flow in hydrologically connected areas
and future availability of groundwater supplies, there are
significant private benefits to landowners, especially in
water short areas. Groundwater trading can help move
water from low-value to high-value areas of use. Previous
work on water trading has focused on surface water
trading and theoretical approaches to analyzing
groundwater trading. Empirical analysis of groundwater
trading is a new area of research, due in part to the lack of
recorded usage, trade data and binding constraints on
groundwater use by landowners.
Unlike many other groundwater-dependent areas
across the nation, the Upper Republican Natural Resource
District (URNRD) has had metering and use restrictions
in place for over 30 years. The URNRD has also
developed some mechanisms to help producers use water
most efficiently under allocation restrictions. Two of the
tools available include creating pools and formally trading
water. Formal water trading occurs when the irrigation
rights are permanently transferred from one field to
another field. When multiple fields are combined to create
a pool, a producer can temporarily move a water
allocation from one field to another field in the same pool.
Within-pool transfers are conducted when fields under the
same owner aggregate their total allocations into a pool, as
approved by the URNRD board, and then redistribute the
water to each field at the owner’s discretion. These
within-pool transfers have much lower transaction costs
than the formal trades, due to less time and money spent
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cooperating with the C ounties and the U .S . D epartm ent of A griculture.
U niversity of N ebrask a E xtension educational program s abide with the non-discrim ination policies
of the U niversity of N ebrask a–Lincoln and the U nited S tates D epartm ent of A griculture.

finding a trading partner and gaining board approval.
Therefore, the URNRD provides a great opportunity to
better understand the impacts of allowing some restricted
trading. Results are useful both for the potential
expansion of groundwater trading in the URNRD and the
rest of Nebraska, as well as in other areas.

investment. Similar results were found with the analysis
of within-pool transfers. Specifically, larger fields and
larger operations are more likely to participate in withinpool transfers, while fields with a higher pumping
capacity or depth to groundwater are less likely to
participate.

Our study examines formal trading and within pool
transfers using thirty years of water use and field level
characteristics provided by the URNRD. The district has
historically allocated water over three to five year
periods, which allows the landowners more flexibility in
planning their irrigation schedules. Allocations began at
22 inches per certified acre in 1980 and have since been
reduced to 13 inches per certified acre for the 2008-2012
allocation period. Specifically, we want to determine if
standard economic criteria based on the cost of pumping
groundwater and the expected yield are useful indicators
in determining trading behavior.

In addition to examining participation in trades and
transfers, we also considered the direction of those
trades/transfers. The MAC curves are used to predict
whether a field was a net buyer or seller of water during
trades/transfers. With formal trading, fields that are
predicted to be sellers are 30 percent more likely to
actually be sellers. This result shows that the variables that
measure the expected profit loss from reduced water use
are significant in determining behavior. This result is
useful in predicting the potential effects of developing
new groundwater markets in other areas. It shows that we
can have some confidence that predictions of trading
behavior in a newly developed market will be accurate.
We also find no evidence of any additional stream
depletion due to trades; in fact, the overall effect of the

To measure some of the relevant economic criteria
we use a marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve that is
calculated based on well-level characteristics and average
market prices.1 The MAC curve
measures the lost profit of reducing
water use for a particular well. Figure
1 provides an example of two different
MAC curves for representative wells.
In Figure 1, annual profits on Field A
are reduced by approximately $23 per
acre if water applications are reduced
by two inches per acre, while annual
profits on Field B are reduced by
approximately $3 per acre for the same
reduction in water use. In this
example, if we observe Field A and
Field B trading water, we would
expect Field A to be the buyer while
Field B is the seller. This is because
the lost profit from reducing water use
is higher for Field A, and so the owner
would be willing to pay for extra water
Figure 1. Marginal Costs of Reducing Irrigation Application
to offset the lost profits.
The analysis uses information on over 3,000 fields in
the URNRD. Results show that larger fields and larger
operation sizes were more likely to participate in a formal
trade. Fields with a higher pumping rate and depth to
groundwater are less likely to participate in formal trades.
Presumably, a well with a higher pumping rate has
greater capacity to meet its own water needs without
trading for additional water. Also, an individual who has
invested in a high pump capacity well may be less likely
to want to sell some of his water after making the capital
1

Specific details on the development of the MAC curves are in Palazzo and
Brovovic, 2012. The underlying costs are generated by Water Optimizer (Martin
et. al., 2007).

water trades that have occurred is a reduction in
streamflow depletion. While this result is not something
that can be applied to other basins, it does reduce some of
the concerns with allowing trading/transfers in the
URNRD.
The results of this analysis show that in both types of
decisions (formal trades and within-pool transfers),
producers behave rationally and generally as expected. If
designed appropriately for the different regions, the curves
and MAC indicators can be used to predict direction and
ultimately the impacts of groundwater trading in an area.

These results will allow us to better predict the effects of expanding groundwater markets in Nebraska and other regions.
However, the results depend on having field-level information that is often not available. Thus, expanding the collection
of data on groundwater use will allow policymakers to be better informed when creating new groundwater markets.
For additional information on the study and results, refer to Juchems (2013) at:
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=agecondiss
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